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Abstract—In [1], we have proposed the MIMO-OFDM PHY
integrated (MOPI) scheme for achieving physical-layer security
in practice without using any cryptographic ciphers. The MOPI
scheme uses channel sounding and physical-layer network coding
(PNC) to prevent eavesdroppers from learning the channel state
information (CSI). Nevertheless, due to the use of multiple
antennas for PNC at transmitter and beamforming at receiver,
it is not possible to have spatial multiplexing nor use space-time
codes in our previous MOPI scheme. In this paper, we propose
a variant of the MOPI scheme, called P-MOPI, that works
with a cryptographic cipher and utilizes precoding matrix index
(PMI) as an efficient key-exchange mechanism. With channel
sounding, the PMI is only known between the transmitter and
the legal receiver. The shared key can then be used, e.g., as
the seed to generate pseudo random bit sequences for securing
subsequent transmissions using a stream cipher. By applying the
same techniques at independent subcarriers of the OFDM system,
the P-MOPI scheme easily allows two communicating parties
to exchange over 100 secret bits. As a result, not only secure
communication but also the MIMO gain can be guaranteed by
using the P-MOPI scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work, Wyner showed that, by information-
theoretic arguments, it is possible to achieve communication
confidentiality by exploiting the spatial diversity of wireless
channels [2]. Wyner’s theoretical investigation has aroused
many different proposals, such as [3], [4], [5], [6], [7].
While most of the existing physical-layer (PHY) security
works focus on information theoretical approaches that are
difficult to implement in reality, our recent work [1] is one
of the pioneering works that propose practical schemes for
PHY security. In the work, a MIMO-OFDM PHY integrated
(MOPI) scheme has been proposed to provide communication
confidentiality without using any cryptographic ciphers in
wireless networks. By the use of channel sounding, MOPI
prevents an eavesdropper from learning the channel state
information (CSI) of the channel between the eavesdropper
and the transmitting node from the preambles or pilot tones. A
bit-interleaved coded-modulation (BICM)-based physical layer
network coding (PNC) scheme has been proposed such that an
eavesdropper, due to lack of CSI, will suffer from very high
bit error rate (BER) in decoding. The MOPI scheme has been
shown to provide excellent security, forcing the eavesdropper
to have large estimation error even if blind channel estimation
is used. The computational complexity is also prohibitively
expensive if the eavesdropper resorts to brute-force search to
recover the CSI.
Although the MOPI scheme is promising in providing
realistic PHY security, it has a serious drawback. Since the
multiple antennas at the transmitter are used for PNC and the
multiple antennas at the receiver are used for beamforming, it
is impossible for this MOPI scheme to have spatial multiplex-
ing nor use space-time codes. This limits the capability of the
MIMO system. In this paper, a variant of the MOPI scheme—
called P-MOPI—based on the precoding matrix index (PMI)
is proposed. The precoding matrix index, commonly applied
in MIMO systems nowadays, is used as the secret key. It
is well known that the MIMO system performance can be
enhanced by precoding at the transmitter, i.e., multiplying the
signal vector by a matrix before transmission. With the optimal
precoding at the transmitter, the MIMO channel can be trans-
formed into several parallel subchannels, and the channel ca-
pacity can be achieved. Typically there is a universal codebook
that consists of a finite number of precoding matrices. Due
to different channel realizations between the transmitter-legal
receiver and the transmitter-eavesdropper pairs, the precoding
matrix is only known between the transmitter and the legal
receiver, so the precoding matrix indices can therefore be used
as keys. With the proposed efficient key-exchange mechanism,
the shared secret key, easily over 100 bits long, can be used,
e.g., as the seed to generate pseudo random bit sequences,
and secured MIMO communications can then be achieved,
by using a stream cipher. This is the fundamental difference
between MOPI and P-MOPI despite their otherwise striking
similarity: while MOPI is designed to replace a cryptographic
cipher and encrypts messages at physical layer, P-MOPI is
designed to work with one—it merely uses physics to establish
the shared key between the communicating parties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant
background information is reviewed in Section II. The scenario
considered is described in Section III. The PMI-based key-
exchange scheme is described in Section IV. The performance
of the proposed P-MOPI scheme is evaluated using computer
simulation, with the results presented and discussed in Section
V. Conclusions are addressed in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUNDS
A. MIMO Systems with Precoding
First let us review how the precoding matrix is used in
the MIMO system. Alice first sends out a reference signal
for Bob to estimate the channel matrix HAB and decides the
optimal precoding matrix. Note that the channel here stands
for the channel on a subcarrier or on certain subcarriers of
OFDM, and the index of subcarrier is omitted for simplicity.
In practical situations, in order to reduce the complexity and
the feedback overhead, a universal codebook F that consists of
a finite number of precoding matrices is used. Each precoding
matrix in the codebook has an index called precoding matrix
index (PMI).
Consider the following MIMO channel capacity formula
CH,F = log2 det[In +
Es
nsσ2
F
†
H
†
HF], (1)
where In is the identity matrix with n denoting the minimum
number of antennas at Alice and Bob, Es is the symbol
energy, ns is the noise power, σ2 is the noise variance, †
means the Hermitian, F is the precoding matrix, and H is the
channel. Bob finds the precoding matrix and its corresponding
PMI from the codebook that maximizes the channel capacity.
Mathematically,
Fˆ = argmax
F∈F
CH,F, (2)
where Fˆ is the best precoding matrix from the codebook F .
We denote the PMI associated with Fˆ by iPMI.
B. Stream Ciphers
A stream cipher is a symmetric-key cipher based on the
idea of Shannon’s one-time pads. Typically, a stream cipher
generates a sequence of a pseudorandom bit stream called the
keystream, which is XOR’ed with the plaintext. It is this bit-
by-bit way of encryption that gives the name “stream cipher.”
A perhaps simplest form of a stream cipher is a linear
feedback shift register (LFSR) with its output fed into a
nonlinear filter function to generate the keystream. Note that
the nonlinear filter function is of essential importance here;
otherwise the structure of an n-bit LFSR can easily be
recovered using the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm given 2n
keystream bits. Such a nonlinear filter, if well-designed, can
resist most attacks if the number of leaked keystream bits is
relatively small compared with the product of the LFSR width
and the algebraic degree of the nonlinear filter. The interested
reader is referred to [8] for further detail in filter design. It is
also possible to construct other kinds of LFSR-based stream
Figure 1. System Model.
ciphers. One such example is Trivium, a combiner generator
type of stream cipher, which has a security level of 280 and can
be implemented with slightly more than two thousand NAND
gate equivalents [9].
It is also possible to construct a stream cipher using a
standard or light-weight block cipher. For example, KATAN
and KTANTAN belong to a family of small and efficient block
ciphers. The family is based on LFSR, and they share the same
key size of 80 bits. KTANTAN is smaller than KATAN, but
the key is burnt into the device and hence can not be changed.
The smallest cipher in the family can be implemented in less
than 500 gates in 0.13 µm CMOS technology, while achieving
encryption speed of 12.5 kbits/sec. More details about KATAN
and KTANTAN can be found in [10].
III. SYSTEM SETUP
The system model, shown in Fig. 1, consists of three nodes,
Alice, Bob, and Eve, and three wireless MIMO channels:
H
AB
, H
AE
, and HBE . The source node, Alice, wants to
transmit confidential messages to the destination node, Bob,
through HAB. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless chan-
nels, these messages will be overheard by the eavesdropper,
Eve, through HAE . If Bob transmits some signals to Alice,
those signals will also be overheard by Eve through HBE .
It is assumed that the channel between Alice and Bob is
symmetric, i.e., HAB = HBA, and the channel realizations of
H
AB
, H
AE
, and HBE are independent to each other. Alice
is assumed to have four antennas while Bob is assumed to
have two antennas and both Alice and Bob use the OFDM
technique during transmission, whereas Eve can have an
arbitrary number of antennas.
As will be described in details later, a universal codebook
containing precoding matrices and PMI’s for precoding is
available to Alice, Bob, and Eve, and the MIMO channel
capacity function for PMI estimation is known by Eve.
IV. THE P-MOPI SCHEMES
In the original MOPI scheme [1], the multiple antennas at
the transmitter are used for PNC and the multiple antennas at
the receiver are used for beamforming. This provides highly
secure wireless communications. Yet, the scheme sacrifices the
MIMO capability of using spatial multiplexing or space-time
codes. In order to use antennas in a more efficient manner, we
propose the P-MOPI scheme in this paper, which allows Alice
and Bob to use PMI to exchange keys for subsequent use in
cryptographic ciphers to secure their communications.
A. P-MOPI
In a typical MIMO system with precoding, Alice acquires
the PMI via the feedback from Bob. Eve can easily detect
the PMI through eavesdropping. But what if the PMI is not
fed back to Alice, and instead, Bob sends the same reference
signal to Alice? Under the assumption of channel reciprocity
(HAB = HBA), Alice is able to compute the PMI that is
the same as Bob’s. At Eve’s side, without the feedback, she
is unable to figure out the PMI since the channel HAE is
different from HAB (and HBA). Now the PMI, only shared
between Alice and Eve, can be used as a secret key.
The typical size of PMI is 2 to 6 bits long depending
on the number of MIMO antennas. Let us assume it is 4
bits. Through our scheme, Alice and Bob can share 4 secret
bits over one subcarrier. In OFDM systems, the independent
fading realizations between subcarriers or subbands lead to
abundant generation of independent PMI’s. As long as the
whole channel can be divided into more than 25 subbands
with nearly uncorrelated fading which are easy to acquire in
general, our scheme enables Alice and Bob to share over 100
secret bits. The secret key can then be used to generate a
random sequence for data to be transmitted securely using
a stream cipher. With a key of size over 100 secret bits, a
security level way above O
(
2100
) (meaning Eve should try at
least about O
(
2100
)
times to approach her best performance)
can be achieved, which is the usual strength requirement for
a cryptographic cipher.
The steps of the proposed scheme are summarized below:
1) Alice transmits a reference signal to Bob to let Bob make
channel estimation.
2) Bob estimates the channel on a single subcarrier or
a subband (which consists of several subcarriers de-
pending on the channel coherence bandwidth). Channel
realization HAB is acquired at Bob’s side.
3) Bob conducts the corresponding precoding matrix FˆBob
for HAB by finding argmax
F
CH,F. He regards the PMI
iPMI,Bob of the precoding matrix FˆBob as a key and put
it into his key set KBob.
4) During the next time slot, Bob sends a sounding signal
to Alice. Alice acquires the corresponding precoding
matrix FˆAlice for HBA for every subcarrier. Alice then
puts iPMI,Alice into its key set KAlice. Since the channel
reciprocity holds, FˆBob and FˆAlice are the same, and so
are KBob and KAlice.
5) Alice and Bob may drop out-of-date keys to make sure
KBob = KAlice at any time.
6) Alice uses a stream cipher to encrypt data with the key
set KAlice. Afterwards, Alice transmits the encrypted
data to Bob and Bob decrypts the data using its own key
set KBob. During the transmission, precoding is applied
in order to achieve better MIMO performance.
7) (Optional rekeying) In rare situations where KBob 6=
KAlice, Alice and Bob need to rekey by going to Step 1.
Such a mismatched key can be detected, e.g., as follows.
Alice first picks a random number X and transmits the
encryption of X under KAlice, along with the SHA-
256 digest of X in plaintext. At the receiving end,
Bob decrypts using KBob, calculates its SHA-256 digest,
checks to see if it matches the received digest, and
declares a rekeying if there is a mismatch.
B. P-MOPI for slow-varying channel
In the P-MOPI scheme, PMI is used as the key. In the
slow-varying channel, the optimal precoding matrix will stay
similar, so the PMI (and the key) will be the same for a
long period of time. From the security point of view, keys
should be changed frequently, so that means the basic P-
MOPI scheme proposed earlier only works well under the
fast-varying channel. For the slow-varying channel, we need
to make a revision, as proposed below.
1) Alice transmits the reference signal s regularly in order
to update her precoding matrix to match the latest
channel condition.
2) If the new PMI is different from the previous PMI, Bob
replies with the reference signal r; if the new PMI is
the same as the previous PMI, Bob first replies a flag
bit to inform Alice the channel is static, and then sends
a rotated reference signal Ur immediately, where U is
a randomly generated unitary matrix.
3) The flag bit is for Alice to remain the same precoding
for the static channel , and the rotated reference signal
Ur is for her to obtain the key through PMI estimation.
Since Bob knows U, he obtains the PMI as well.
4) Alice then uses the key for stream cipher as before.
5) Since Alice still transmits the normal reference signal
s regularly, Bob can estimate HAB all the time. If
the PMI for precoding is not the same as the previous
PMI, it means the channel becomes dynamic. Then Bob
transmits another flag bit to inform Alice to change back
to normal P-MOPI scheme without U.
Notice that in order to estimate the PMI for the reference signal
Ur, Alice and Bob need to perform the following operation
(instead of Eqn. (2)):
Fˆ = argmax
F∈F
C¯H,F, (3)
where
C¯H,F = log2 det[In +
Es
nsσ2
F
† (HU)† (HU)F], (4)
= log det[In +
Es
nsσ2
F¯
†
H
†
HF¯], (5)
where F¯ = UF. This means that Alice tries to find the
best precoding matrix based on a modified channel capacity
function.
The purpose of introducing U is to generate a new key
when the channel does not change much. Apparently Eve
cannot acquire any information about U. Moreover, the PMI
is obtained through an optimization process, which is an non-
linear process. Without knowing the channel H, it is hopeless
for Eve to obtain the correct PMI even when the codebook
and the MIMO channel capacity function is known publicly.
However, we should consider the influence of U. For Alice, the
estimation effective channel is (HAB+n)U = HABU+nU,
where n is denoted as white gaussian noise. For Bob, the
estimation effective channel is HABU + n. If U is chosen
as unitary matrix, the estimation error of Alice has the same
statistics compared to Bob’s estimation error. It is obvious that
there is no noise enhancement with the multiplication of U.
Compared to the basic P-MOPI scheme, the P-MOPI
scheme for the slow-varying channel needs to transmit one
extra flag bit and requires Alice and Bob to do extra com-
putation for finding PMI. Nevertheless, the security is highly
improved.
V. SCHEME EVALUATION
The success of the proposed P-MOPI relies on the follow-
ing factors: channel coherence time and channel coherence
bandwidth. Channel coherence time determines whether Alice
and Bob can obtain the same PMI and channel coherence
bandwidth decides how many independent channels can be
obtained. The more available independent channels, the more
secret bits can be generated. In this section, we will evaluate
the feasibility of the proposed P-MOPI scheme.
We take the simulation set up generally used in
popular 4G standard - Long Term Evolution (LTE)
[11], [12] to evaluate P-MOPI scheme. The detailed
simulation parameters are provided in the following tables.
Simulation Setup
Channel model SCME channel model
MIMO system 4× 2 single user MIMO
Subcarrier bandwidth 15 kHz
Total bandwidth 20 MHz
Center frequency 2 GHz
SCME scenario Urban macro
Bob’s velocity 0, 3, 10 (km/hr)
Codebook 4-bit Householder codebook
A. Channel coherence bandwidth
The security of the communications mainly depends on
the size of the key space, i.e. the number of available keys.
Hence, it is desirable to know how many available keys can be
generated by our P-MOPI scheme. Fig. 2 shows the simulation
result of the channel correlation among the subcarriers in the
SCME urban-macro channel model. In general, a correlation
below 0.5 can be regarded as nearly uncorrelated. We can see
that the correlation decreases to 0.5 at about a 20-subcarrier
separation, which shows that the coherence bandwidth of the
channel is about 20 × 15k = 300 kHz. With total system
bandwidth 20 MHz, the number of independent PMI’s can be
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Figure 2. Channel correlation among the subcarriers under noiseless Spatial
Channel Modeling Extended (SCME) urban-macro channel model.
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Figure 3. Probability of Alice and Bob obtaining the same PMI versus the
time difference of channel esitmations under noiseless SCME urban-macro
channel model.
acquired is 20M/300k ∼= 66 in one time slot. With the 4-
bit Householder codebook, 4×66 = 264 bits are generated as
the cryptography key. It outperforms the conventional required
security level of 80-bits key block cipher.
B. Probability of Alice and Bob obtaining the same key
In the wireless communications, the velocity of the mobile
device significantly affects the channel coherence time, which
determines the downlink/uplink switching duration in our P-
MOPI scheme. In Fig. 3, it depicts the probability of Alice and
Bob obtaining the same PMI versus the time difference of their
channel estimations. Note that the time difference is resulted
from the delay of Bob sending the reference signal back to
Alice. When Bob is not moving, the channel is static and the
PMIs are always the same. With Bob moving at a speed of
3 km/hr, the probability can be held above 0.98 for 1 ms. With
Bob moving at 10km/hr, the probability remains above 0.95
for 1 ms. Remember that the random rotation unitary matrix
U is used for the slow-varying channel. From the figure, the
existence of U does not decrease the performance. It even
increases the probability when Alice’s and Bob’s channels
are not closely correlated. The concept is that if two channel
realizations are separated from each other, the multiplication
of U provides them the similar basis. So the two channel
realizations will become closer after the rotation by U.
C. Influence of channel estimation error
In this subsection, we illustrate the influences of the channel
estimation error in Fig. 4. The estimation error is modeled as
a Gaussian noise. The SNR is defined as the ratio of reference
signal power to the noise variance. From the figure, at a
moderate SNR like 40dB, the influence of estimation error
can be neglected. Especially, the reference signal power is
usually set large in order to ensure the correctness of channel
estimation. And we can see that with U, the probability of
both PMI’s being the same is significantly increased.
D. Rekeying
The P-MOPI scheme requires channel reciprocity in order
for achieving key exchange between Alice and Bob. Even
though the channel is reciprocal, sometimes the noise or
interference in the channel can be so high, and the received
reference signals at Alice and Bob are severely distorted such
that iPMI,Alice 6= iPMI,Bob. In these cases, Alice and Bob can
not establish a shared secret key and will need to rekey by
restarting the whole procedure.
Fig. 3 shows the probability that the channel between Alice
and Bob is indeed reciprocal in high-SNR or nearly noiseless
situations. We can see that as long as the time difference
between Alice’s and Bob’s channel soundings is within 1 ms,
the probability that iPMI,Alice = iPMI,Bob is very close to 1,
resulting in low chance of rekeying. However, for channels
with higher mobility, the probability drops and the chance of
rekeying gets higher.
Although rekeying is not a fatal problem as Alice and Bob
can restart the keying process and will succeed in a small
number of rounds with high probability, frequent rekeying
will result in performance degradation, which happens when
the channel varies too quickly or when the mobility is too
high. Therefore, it is still desirable to incorporate channel
coding with our P-MOPI in our future work to reduce the
chance of rekeying. This can be done by transmitting reference
signals over contiguous subcarriers and use the similarity of
the channels experienced by these subcarriers as source of
redundancy. Another approach would be to modify the P-
MOPI design so that Bob can have some control on the
PMI experienced by Alice instead of solely determined by the
channel. If this can be done, channel coding can be applied.
Such design is currently in progress.
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Figure 4. PMI reciprocity probability versus SNR under SCME urban-macro
channel model
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient secret key ex-
change mechanism for MIMO-OFDM systems. The proposed
P-MOPI scheme utilizes the precoding matrix indices as secret
keys. The PMI is obtained by finding the precoding matrix
that maximizes the MIMO channel capacity function. Due to
independent channel realizations, the eavesdropper is unable
to learn the channel state information between the transmitter
and the legal receiver, resulting in the secure communication.
Two P-MOPI schemes were proposed for fast-varying and
slow-varying channels respectively. A random matrix is intro-
duced in the P-MOPI scheme for the slow-varying channel
condition to update keys frequently. The P-MOPI scheme,
unlike the previous version of MOPI scheme, can take full
advantage of the multiple antennas through precoding. The
feasibility of the scheme has been evaluated through computer
simulations.
Finally, we note that it is also possible to use a random-
ness extractor such as a cryptographic hash function under
appropriate circumstances [13] to extract shared secrets from
the PMIs of all subcarriers instead of uncorrelated subcarriers,
as we have proposed and examined in this paper. It warrants
further investigation as whether this will improve or worsen the
rekeying probability, an important trade-off between security
and usability.
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